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GREENBERG, Circuit Judge. 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
 This matter comes on before this Court on an appeal in a 
case in which a former inmate in the custody of the New Jersey 
Department of Corrections (“NJDOC”), now the appellant, 
Alexandra Chavarriaga, claims that correctional officers 
violated her constitutional rights when, without proper 
authorization, they took her from one place of confinement to 
another where they denied her potable water, clothing, and 
sanitary napkins and related medications and subjected her to an 
unlawful body cavity search.  The District Court on March 27, 
2014, granted three defendants’ motion for summary judgment 
and dismissed appellant’s remaining claims against the other 
defendants, as it held that she did not demonstrate that there 
were issues of material fact requiring the Court to deny the 
summary judgment motion and appellant’s complaint did not 
allege facts constituting a cause of action.  Chavarriaga v. New 
Jersey, Civ. No. 12-4313, 2014 WL 1276345 (D.N.J. Mar. 27, 
2014) (“Chavarriaga”).     
 We will affirm the District Court’s March 27, 2014 order 
granting summary judgment under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 to 
defendants former New Jersey Attorney General Jeffery S. 
Chiesa, New Jersey Commissioner of Corrections Gary M. 
Lanigan, and Correctional Sergeant Janice Brown, and, with the 
significant exceptions that we discuss below, we will affirm the 
order dismissing the action pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6) 
as to the remaining defendants, the NJDOC, John Doe #1, John 
Doe #2, John Doe #3, John Doe #4, Jane Doe, Marcus Wair, 
Philip Sheppard, and Various Unknown Corrections Employees. 
 Appellant sued Chiesa in his official and individual capacity but 
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she sued the other defendants only in their individual capacities.1 
 The defendants other than the NJDOC, Chiesa, and Lanigan are 
NJDOC correctional officers.  We reach our result even though 
only Chiesa, Lanigan, and Brown were served with process and 
have been the only defendants participating in this case.2  We 
also will affirm the Court’s denial of appellant’s cross-motion 
for partial summary judgment against Lanigan, Brown, and the 
NJDOC and its denial of appellant’s motion for sanctions 
against the participating defendants’ counsel arising from what 
appellant considers was their obstruction of the discovery 
process.  In addition, we will affirm the Court’s denial of 
appellant’s motion for class action certification as moot, but do 
so without prejudice to appellant renewing the motion on the 
remand for which we are providing.  Finally, we will remand the 
case to the District Court for further proceedings that can go 
forward only if appellant is able to amend her complaint to name 
real persons as defendants. 
 
II.  STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
                                                 
1 Appellant recites in her brief that she sued the other defendants 
in both their individual and official capacities but her complaint 
recites that she was suing only Chiesa in both capacities.  This 
discrepancy has no bearing on our outcome because if she had 
indicated in her complaint that she was suing all of the 
defendants in both capacities our result would not be different. 
 
2 We review the matter with respect to the other defendants even 
if fictional or unknown because the District Court decided the 
case on the merits with respect to all the defendants and 
appellant’s appeal is from an order including that disposition. 
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 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331, 1343, and 1367, and we have jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1291.   
 
III.  STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 We exercise plenary review over a district court’s grant 
of summary judgment.  Blackhawk v. Pennsylvania, 381 F.3d 
202, 206 (3d Cir. 2004).  A court may grant a motion for 
summary judgment if, after it considers all probative materials 
of record, with inferences drawn in favor of the non-moving 
party, the court is satisfied that there are no genuine issues of 
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter 
of law.  Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 330, 106 S.Ct. 
2548, 2556 (1986); Brooks v. Kyler, 204 F.3d 102, 105 n.5 (3d 
Cir. 2000).   A dispute over an issue is “genuine” only if a 
reasonable jury could find in the non-movant’s favor on that 
issue.  Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48, 
106 S.Ct. 2505, 2510 (1986).  But the party opposing a motion 
for summary judgment “must do more than simply show that 
there is some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts.”  Big 
Apple BMW, Inc. v. BMW of N. Am., Inc., 974 F.2d 1358, 
1363 (3d Cir. 1992) (citation and internal quotation marks 
omitted).  Rather, that party must point to specific factual 
evidence showing that there is a genuine dispute on a material 
issue requiring resolution at trial.  See Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323-
24, 106 S.Ct. at 2551.  
 We also exercise plenary review over a district court’s 
dismissal of a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state 
a claim.  Pension Trust Fund for Operating Eng’rs v. Mortg. 
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Asset Securitization Transactions, Inc., 730 F.3d 263, 268 (3d 
Cir. 2013); Allah v. Seiverling, 229 F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 
2000).  When considering a motion to dismiss a complaint under 
Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim, “[f]irst, the court must 
take note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.” 
 Malleus v. George, 641 F.3d 560, 563 (3d Cir. 2011) (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  Then the court must 
determine if a claim has facial plausibility, a threshold that can 
be reached only when a plaintiff pleads factual content—as 
opposed to mere conclusions—allowing the court to “draw the 
reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the 
misconduct alleged.”  Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678, 129 
S.Ct. 1937, 1949 (2009).  Although the court “must accept the 
allegations in the [c]omplaint as true, [it is] not compelled to 
accept unsupported conclusions and unwarranted inferences, or 
a legal conclusion couched as a factual allegation.”  Morrow v. 
Balaski, 719 F.3d 160, 165 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Baraka v. 
McGreevey, 481 F.3d 187, 195 (3d Cir. 2007)) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
 
IV.  BACKGROUND 
  A. Factual Allegations 
 Appellant alleged in her final amended complaint, which 
we usually simply call “the complaint,” that defendants 
subjected her to cruel and unusual punishment and denied her 
equal protection and due process of law in violation of 42 
U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986, the United States Constitution, 
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and parallel New Jersey state law.3  In addition, appellant 
claimed that defendants did not follow mandated state-law 
procedures in making the body cavity search of her.  When we 
consider these allegations, we view them in a light most 
favorable to appellant.  Appellant alleged that in 2010 and 2011, 
while she was in NJDOC custody, custodial personnel placed 
her at different times in the Garrett House, a residential 
community release program, the New Jersey State Prison 
(“NJSP”), and the Edna Mahan Correctional Facility (“EMCF”), 
and that they unlawfully transferred her three times from the 
Garrett House to the other facilities.  Appellant remained in 
NJDOC custody until March 25, 2013, when she completed her 
sentence.   
 Appellant alleged in her complaint that she was subjected 
to constitutional violations on three separate occasions in 2010 
and 2011, during the times that she was being transferred to the 
EMCF from the Garrett House and, while en route, the custodial 
personnel temporarily housed her in a cell at the NJSP.  Indeed, 
she alleged that certain of the transfers in themselves denied her 
due process and equal protection of the law.  Beyond the 
transfers, she alleged that the first violation occurred on April 7, 
2010, when custodial personnel first removed her from the 
Garrett House for two alleged infractions of NJDOC rules and 
she was held unclothed at the NJSP overnight in cell South-l-
GG-12, a cell that she characterizes as a “Psychiatric Unit.”  
(J.A. 23, 24, 75.)  But that allegation is somewhat tangential to 
                                                 
3 In her complaint, appellant alleged a cause of action against 
Chiesa and Lanigan based on 42 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(2), a statute 
that does not exist.  (J.A. 71.)  It is possible that she intended to 
cite 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a), which is a jurisdictional statute, but, if 
so, it would add nothing to her case.    
  8 
her case as she does not focus on the events surrounding her first 
removal from the Garrett House.   
 Rather, the case centers on appellant’s allegations 
concerning constitutional violations from which she claims to 
have suffered after having been transferred from the Garrett 
House during her second confinement at the NJSP from May 31, 
2011, to June 2, 2011.  She asserted in her complaint that on this 
occasion the correctional personnel transferred her from the 
Garrett House in retaliation for a suit she had brought against 
detectives in the Somerset County prosecutor’s office arising 
from her claim that they used excessive force in arresting her.  
(J.A. 77.)  She claimed that defendants John Doe #1 and John 
Doe #2 made the second transfer on May 31, 2011, when they 
drove her from the Garrett House to the NJSP without lawful 
authority and that when they arrived at the NJSP, Sergeant 
Brown, a NJDOC supervisor, “ordered all of [her] clothing 
removed, whereupon [her] clothing was taken from her.” (J.A. 
79.)  She asserted that Brown assigned her to cell South-l-GG-
12, where she remained unclothed and was allegedly visible 
from time to time to “male staff and prisoners” for the next three 
days.  (J.A. 81.)  Appellant alleged that defendant Jane Doe 
entered her cell during that three-day period and made a painful 
and unjustified manual body cavity search of her rectum and 
vagina.  (J.A. 79-80.)  Appellant also alleged that the plumbing 
in her cell was not working and, as a result, she was not 
provided with potable water during this three-day period, and 
that when she asked for drinking water the correctional officers 
told her to drink from the cell’s toilet bowl.  (J.A. 80.)  Further, 
she contends that she was not permitted to shower until the last 
day she was at NJSP, on June 2, 2011.  Although there was a 
shower in the South-1-GG unit,  appellant alleged that she was 
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forced to “walk down a spiral staircase to another unit and then 
down a hallway, naked and shackled, in plain view of male 
prisoners and staff, to reach a shower.” (J.A. 81.)  She also 
alleged that the officers denied her sanitary napkins and 
medications for migraine headaches and menstrual cramps.  
(J.A. 80-81.)   
 Appellant alleged that during a third transfer from the 
Garrett House, the NJDOC housed her again at the NJSP in cell 
South-l-GG-12, from December 22, 2011, to December 23, 
2011.  (J.A. 82.)  She alleged that the correctional personnel 
made this third transfer and determined her cell placement in the 
NJSP because of what she claimed was a meritless disciplinary 
complaint that had been filed against her in retaliation for her 
suit against the Somerset County detectives.  Appellant alleged 
that the custodial personnel again deprived her of potable water 
during this third confinement in cell South-l-GG-12.  (J.A. 87.)4 
                                                 
4 Appellant’s complaint only briefly touched on her first and 
third confinements at the NJSP.  As we have indicated, her 
allegations largely focused on her transfers among the three 
facilities that we have identified and on due process, equal 
protection, and cruel and unusual punishment claims based on 
the denial of clothing, potable water, and sanitary napkins and 
related medications, as well as the manual body cavity search, 
during her second NJSP confinement.  For this reason, and 
because she did not allege that the participating defendants were 
involved directly with her treatment during either her first or 
third NJSP confinements, we largely focus our discussion on her 
allegations regarding her transfers and her treatment during her 
second confinement at the NJSP from May 31, 2011, to June 2, 
2011.  
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  Appellant alleged that Chiesa and Lanigan were “well 
aware of some or all of the wrongdoing described [in the 
complaint], [but] did nothing to punish the wrongdoers and did 
nothing to prevent recurrences, thereby approving of the 
outrageous conduct inflicted upon [her] and making themselves 
co-conspirators, aiders and abettors of the other individual 
defendants.”  (J.A. 92.)  For that reason, she claims that Chiesa 
and Lanigan violated her federal and state constitutional rights 
and are liable to her under 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, and 1986 
and N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6-2c.  (J.A. 69, 71.)  Though appellant 
alleged that Chiesa and Lanigan had at least some knowledge of 
the wrongdoings that she described in her complaint, she did not 
identify their source of this knowledge.  Appellant also alleged 
that the NJSP personnel did not repair the faucet and plumbing 
in cell South-l-GG-12 because the NJSP’s Special Investigations 
Division (“SID”) wanted to reserve that cell as a torture cell for 
disfavored inmates like herself.  (J.A. 85.)  Appellant also 
alleged that certain defendants conspired to issue false 
disciplinary charges against her and that the NJDOC wrongfully 
withheld sentence credits from her after the dismissal of the 
disciplinary charges, thereby extending her time in custody.  
(J.A. 86-88.)5 
                                                 
5 In addition to her claim that defendants violated federal and 
state constitutional provisions and civil rights laws, appellant 
alleged in her complaint that defendants violated the New Jersey 
common law (J.A. 73-74), a contention on which she expanded 
in her brief to include the New Jersey Torts Claim Act, which to 
a degree embraces common law principles.  Appellant’s br. at 
36.  We, however, do not address these New Jersey law 
contentions because she did not specify in her brief the Tort 
Claims Act sections that she claims defendants violated and she 
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  B. Procedural History 
 Appellant initiated this action by filing a complaint 
seeking class action status in the Superior Court of New Jersey 
against the NJDOC, Chiesa, Lanigan, Greg Bartkowski, an 
administrator at the NJSP, Brown, John Doe #1, John Doe #2, 
and Jane Doe.  On July 12, 2012, Chiesa, Lanigan, and Brown, 
the only defendants served with process and thus the only 
defendants participating in this case, removed the action to the 
District Court.  Appellant filed her final amended complaint on 
August 15, 2013, adding Marcus Wair and Philip Sheppard, 
employees in the NJDOC’s SID, and John Doe #3 and John Doe 
#4 as defendants.  Inasmuch as neither Wair nor Sheppard has 
been served with process neither has participated in this case.  
                                                                                                             
cites only one New Jersey state court case in her opening brief 
and one New Jersey state court case in her reply brief so she did 
not develop the claims adequately.  In the circumstances, she has 
abandoned her Tort Claims Act and common law claims.  See 
United States v. Irizarry, 341 F.3d 273, 286 n.3 (3d Cir. 2003) 
(defendant waived for review on appeal claim that district court 
abused its discretion in denying his severance motion, where he 
did not raise claim in his statement of issues presented on 
appeal, and he did not pursue claim in argument section of his 
brief); McClintock v. Eichelberger, 169 F.3d 812, 817 (3d Cir. 
1999) (declining to entertain a First Amendment retaliation 
argument because “appellants did not plead it as the basis for 
relief in their complaint”); Krouse v. Am. Sterilizer Co., 126 
F.3d 494, 499 n.1 (3d Cir. 1997) (noting that “we will not read 
causes of action into a complaint when they are not present” 
because to do otherwise would deprive defendants of the notice 
required by Fed. R. Civ. P. 8). 
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Appellant did not include Bartkowski as a defendant in this 
complaint.  (J.A. 70-74.) 
 On August 29, 2013, Chiesa, Lanigan, and Brown moved 
to dismiss the complaint pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) and, 
alternatively, moved for summary judgment under Rule 56.  On 
September 19, 2013, appellant, in reliance on Rule 56(d), filed a 
motion requesting the opportunity to take the depositions of:  (1) 
Lanigan; (2) individuals who provided certifications in support 
of the participating defendants’ motion for summary judgment; 
and (3) an individual who she claimed provided her with therapy 
during her confinement at the Garrett House, but these 
depositions never were taken and, according to appellant, the 
District Court never passed on the motion.  (J.A. 117-21.)  Then, 
on December 9, 2013, appellant filed a cross-motion seeking an 
order certifying the matter as a class action, granting her a 
partial summary judgment, and imposing sanctions against the 
participating defendants’ attorneys on the ground that they had 
obstructed the discovery process.  On March 27, 2014, the 
District Court entered an order making the disposition of this 
case that we set forth at the outset of this opinion.  On April 24, 
2014, appellant filed a timely notice of appeal from the Court’s 
March 27, 2014 order. 
 
V.  DISCUSSION 
 A.  The District Court Properly Granted Summary  
            Judgment to Chiesa and Lanigan.  
  1. Appellant failed to allege adequately a §  
                                 1983 claim against Chiesa and Lanigan. 
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 Appellant appeals from the District Court’s March 27, 
2014 order granting summary judgment to Chiesa and Lanigan 
on her claims against them pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1983, 1985, 
and 1986 and N.J. Stat. Ann. § 10:6-2c.6  Appellant alleged in 
her complaint that Chiesa and Lanigan, by their failure to protect 
her, made “themselves co-conspirators, aiders and abettors of 
the other individual defendants.” (J.A. 92.)  Therefore, she 
claims that they violated her federal and state constitutional 
rights.   
 “The first step in evaluating a section 1983 claim is to 
‘identify the exact contours of the underlying right said to have 
been violated’ and to determine ‘whether the plaintiff has 
alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at all.’”  Nicini v. 
Morra, 212 F.3d 798, 806 (3d Cir. 2000) (quoting Cnty. of 
Sacramento v. Lewis, 523 U.S. 833, 841 n.5, 118 S.Ct. 1708, 
1714 n.5 (1998)).  Next, a plaintiff must demonstrate a 
defendant’s “personal involvement in the alleged wrongs.”  
Rode v. Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988).  A 
plaintiff makes sufficient allegations of a defendant’s personal 
involvement by describing the defendant’s participation in or 
actual knowledge of and acquiescence in the wrongful conduct.  
                                                 
6 Appellant also appeals from that order to the extent that it 
granted summary judgment in favor of Brown but we discuss 
that aspect of her appeal separately, as it raises issues distinct 
from those relating to Chiesa and Lanigan.  Appellant contends 
that the District Court granted summary judgment to Chiesa and 
Lanigan before she had an adequate opportunity for discovery.  
But we are satisfied that further discovery could not have 
revealed facts that would have altered our result on their 
summary judgment motion. 
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Id.  Although a court can infer that a defendant had 
contemporaneous knowledge of wrongful conduct from the 
circumstances surrounding a case, the knowledge must be 
actual, not constructive.  Baker v. Monroe Twp., 50 F.3d 1186, 
1194 (3d Cir. 1995); Rode, 845 F.2d at 1201 n.6.  A plaintiff 
“must portray specific conduct by state officials which violates 
some constitutional right.”  Gittlemacker v. Prasse, 428 F.2d 1, 3 
(3d Cir. 1970).7    
 The District Court correctly granted Chiesa and Lanigan 
summary judgment on appellant’s § 1983 complaint because her 
allegations did not describe their conduct in sufficient detail to 
support her conclusory allegations that they had either actual 
contemporaneous knowledge of or any personal involvement in 
any violation of her constitutional rights.  See Rode, 845 F.2d at 
1207.  Furthermore, inasmuch as the imposition of liability in an 
action under § 1983 and the other civil rights statutes she cites 
depends on the plaintiff showing that the defendant had personal 
involvement in the alleged wrongs, appellant cannot predicate 
defendants’ liability on a respondeat superior theory.  See Parratt 
v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527, 537 n.3, 101 S.Ct. 1908, 1913 n.3 
(1981).  The District Court granted Chiesa and Lanigan 
summary judgment because it believed, although appellant 
contended otherwise, that she was attempting to establish that 
they were liable based on their subordinates’ alleged acts, and 
therefore appellant impermissibly predicated her complaint 
                                                 
7 The defenses and immunities applicable to federal 
constitutional claims apply with equal force to parallel New 
Jersey state constitutional claims.  See generally N.J. Stat. Ann. 
§§ 10:6-1 et seq.  Consequently, we do not make a separate 
analysis of the state-law constitutional claims. 
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against them on a respondeat superior theory of liability.8   
 We realize that appellant argues that, rather than relying 
on a respondeat superior basis for liability, she alleged that 
Chiesa and Lanigan were liable as policymakers.  Courts 
recognize that liability under § 1983 may be imposed on an 
official with final policymaking authority if that official 
establishes an unconstitutional policy that, when implemented, 
injures a plaintiff.  Sample v. Diecks, 885 F.2d 1099, 1118 (3d 
Cir. 1989).  However, to establish a claim against a policymaker 
under § 1983 a plaintiff must allege and prove that the official 
established or enforced policies and practices directly causing 
the constitutional violation.  Id. at 1114 (“Thus, when a 
policymaking official establishes a constitutionally inadequate 
state procedure for depriving people of a protected interest and 
someone is thereafter deprived of such an interest, the official 
has ‘subjected’ that person to a due process violation.”); see also 
Berlanti v. Bodman, 780 F.2d 296, 300-01 (3d Cir. 1985).   
 Appellant’s arguments regarding policymaking liability 
                                                 
8 We also point out that a court can affirm a judgment for any 
reason supported by the record and therefore a court may affirm 
an order for summary judgment for a defendant if the complaint 
does not state a claim on which relief may be granted.  See In re 
Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 610 F. Supp. 2d 
600, 607 (S.D. Tex. 2009) (“While ‘failure to state a claim’ is 
usually challenged by a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), 
it also may serve as a basis for summary judgment.  In a 
summary judgment context, the failure to state a claim is the 
‘functional equivalent’ of the failure to raise a genuine issue of 
material fact.” (citing Whalen v. Carter, 954 F.2d 1087, 1098 
(5th Cir. 1992))).   
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are insufficient.  Appellant’s principal allegations were that the 
prison personnel deprived her of potable water at the NJSP for 
several days on two separate occasions, subjected her to an 
impermissible manual body cavity search during her second 
confinement at the NJSP, denied her clothing on two separate 
occasions at the NJSP, and denied her sanitary napkins and 
medications during her second confinement at the NJSP.  But 
she did not allege in her complaint that the persons directly 
involved in this treatment or the other treatment of which she 
complains were implementing policies that Chiesa or Lanigan 
had promulgated or were following existing practices that they 
countenanced likely to result in the violation of inmates’ 
constitutional rights.  Thus, she did not allege that Chiesa or 
Lanigan established policies to deny potable water to inmates, to 
subject inmates to excessively intrusive body cavity searches, or 
to subject inmates to the other treatment of which she 
complains.  Therefore, neither Chiesa nor Lanigan can be held 
responsible on a policymaker theory of liability for the alleged 
violations of appellant’s constitutional rights with respect to the 
denial of water, the body cavity search, or other treatment of 
which she complains.  See Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 
U.S. 397, 404, 417, 117 S.Ct. 1382, 1388, 1394 (1997).  
Inasmuch as appellant did not allege facts supporting any of her 
claims that could justify imposing liability on Chiesa or Lanigan 
on the basis of any theory of liability under § 1983, we will 
affirm the order for summary judgment on the aspects of the 
claims in the complaint against them under that section and 
parallel New Jersey law. 
  2. Appellant’s §§ 1985 and 1986 claims      
                                 against Chiesa and Lanigan fail for the    
                                 same reasons as her § 1983 claims           
  17 
                                 against them. 
 Appellant advanced conspiracy claims in her complaint 
pursuant to 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985 and 1986 against Chiesa and 
Lanigan, but, like her § 1983 claims, they also fail as a matter of 
law.  Under 42 U.S.C. § 1985, a plaintiff may bring a claim for 
conspiracy to violate an individual’s civil rights in violation of § 
1983, and under 42 U.S.C. § 1986 a plaintiff may bring a claim 
based on the allegations made in support of a § 1983 claim 
against a responsible official who does not prevent the 
conspiratorial acts enumerated in § 1985.  But a defendant 
cannot be liable under § 1985 or § 1986 unless the defendant 
had some awareness of the underlying violation.  See Clark v. 
Clabaugh, 20 F.3d 1290, 1295 (3d Cir. 1994) (“[A] § 1986 
plaintiff must show that . . . the defendant had actual knowledge 
of a § 1985 conspiracy . . . .”); Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207-08 
(rejecting plaintiff’s § 1985 conspiracy claim because she did 
not show defendant’s knowledge of alleged civil rights 
violation).  Inasmuch as appellant did not plead a valid § 1983 
claim against either Chiesa or Lanigan because she did not make 
an adequate allegation that they had knowledge of any 
deprivation of her constitutional rights, her §§ 1985 and 1986 
claims against them fail as well.9  We accordingly will affirm 
                                                 
9 The District Court believed that a claim appellant made 
regarding deprivation of sentence credits was moot because she 
had served her maximum sentence and had been released from 
custody.  Chavarriaga, 2014 WL 1276345, at *14.  We, 
however, disagree because appellant is seeking damages on the 
claim, not an order for her release from custody.  Therefore, we 
have considered her deprivation of sentence credits claim on the 
merits but have concluded that it is not meritorious.  
Accordingly, we will affirm the Court’s dismissal of this claim.  
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In this regard, we point out that the complaint alleged that the 
disciplinary proceedings against appellant were dismissed, but 
afterwards “the Department of Corrections arbitrarily and 
capriciously refused to restore any of the lost remission credits” 
and the failure to do so “wrongly delayed [appellant from] 
obtaining freedom.”  (J.A. 88.)  Furthermore, in her brief she 
listed as a related case a habeas corpus action in which she 
asserted that the NJDOC did not restore the lost good time 
credits following the dismissal of the disciplinary charges that 
led to her loss of the credits.  Appellant’s br. at 4.  But the Court 
correctly dismissed the NJDOC from this case on Eleventh 
Amendment grounds.  We are aware that even though appellant 
does not contend that the NJDOC lacks Eleventh Amendment 
immunity, she does contend that the participating defendants 
waived an Eleventh Amendment immunity defense by removing 
the case to the District Court.  We are perplexed by this 
contention because the NJDOC did not remove the case and it is 
the only defendant to whom the Court granted Eleventh 
Amendment immunity.  Surely it cannot be argued seriously that 
the participating defendants could waive the NJDOC’s 
immunity when it had not been served with process in the case 
and thus did not have the opportunity to decline to consent to the 
remand.  See 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2)(A).  Though appellant did 
allege that corrections personnel conspired to deny her good 
time credits, she did not explain how they were involved in 
awarding or restoring the credits.  (J.A. 92.)  Moreover, 
appellant did not adequately plead a restoration of credits claim 
against the participating defendants in her complaint or, indeed, 
plead such a claim against any defendant except perhaps the 
NJDOC.  However, as we have indicated, the Court properly 
dismissed the NJDOC on immunity grounds.   Regardless of 
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the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to Chiesa and 
Lanigan on the counts of the complaint based on appellant’s §§ 
1985 and 1986 claims and her claims under parallel state law.10 
 B. The District Court Properly Dismissed                
                      Appellant’s Due Process and Equal Protection   
                      Claims Against Brown, John Doe #1, John Doe 
                      #2, and Unnamed Defendants Based on Her       
                      Transfers Among Facilities. 
 The District Court held that appellant’s complaint that 
her transfers among the three facilities violated her federal and 
state constitutional rights to due process and equal protection of 
the law did not state a claim on which relief could be granted.11  
                                                                                                             
Eleventh Amendment immunity, however, § 1983 does not 
create a cause of action against states or state officials acting in 
their official capacities.  See Will v. Mich. Dep’t of State Police, 
491 U.S. 58, 66, 71, 109 S.Ct. 2304, 2307, 2309 (1989).  
Finally, on the sentence credits issue we point out that a claim 
that credits due an inmate were not restored is distinct from a 
claim that the disciplinary proceedings leading to the loss of the 
credits were initiated wrongfully. 
 
10 Chiesa and Lanigan cannot be liable for appellant’s transfers 
because, as we explain below, the transfers did not violate her 
constitutional rights. 
 
11 Appellant contends that the District Court should not have 
granted summary judgment to Brown as she did not have an 
adequate opportunity to conduct discovery on her claims against 
Brown.  Yet she did not include Brown in her September 19, 
2013 Rule 56(d) motion requesting an opportunity to take 
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In particular, appellant alleged that Brown, a NJDOC 
supervisor, violated her due process and equal protection rights 
when she conspired with unidentified prison personnel to 
remove appellant from the Garrett House and confine her in 
NJSP cell South-l-GG-12.   
 Due process of law protects “persons against deprivations 
of life, liberty, or property; and those who seek to invoke its 
procedural protection must establish that one of these interests is 
at stake.”  Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 221, 125 S.Ct. 
2384, 2389 (2005).  But an inmate does not have the right to “be 
placed in any particular prison,” including halfway homes and 
community release programs.  Meachum v. Fano, 427 U.S. 215, 
224, 96 S.Ct. 2532, 2538 (1976); Asquith v. Dep’t of Corr., 186 
F.3d 407, 411-12 (3d Cir. 1999).  A state has broad authority to 
confine an inmate in any of its institutions.  Meachum, 427 U.S. 
                                                                                                             
depositions so she could oppose the participating defendants’ 
motion for summary judgment even though she had not deposed 
Brown already.  In any event, we are satisfied that Brown was 
entitled to a judgment under Rule 12(b)(6) and therefore 
appellant’s loss of opportunity for discovery, if she had such a 
loss, did not prejudice her as a court adjudicates a Rule 12(b)(6) 
motion on the basis of the complaint and not on the basis of a 
record developed for consideration on a summary judgment 
motion.  Once again, we note that a court may affirm a judgment 
for any reason supported by the record and thus we may affirm 
an order for summary judgment for a defendant if the complaint 
does not state a claim on which relief may be granted.  See In re 
Enron Corp. Sec., Derivative & ERISA Litig., 610 F. Supp. 2d 
600, 607 (S.D. Tex. 2009).  This principle is particularly 
applicable here, as Brown, a prevailing defendant, sought a 
dismissal on that basis in the District Court.  
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at 224, 96 S.Ct. at 2538.  Thus, courts recognize that a state’s 
authority to place inmates anywhere within the prison system is 
among “a wide spectrum of discretionary actions that 
traditionally have been the business of prison administrators 
rather than of the federal courts.”  Id. at 225, 96 S.Ct. at 2538.  
Consequently, custodial personnel do not infringe an inmate’s 
liberty interests by placing her in one custodial facility rather 
than another.  Id.   
 Our analysis leads us to affirm the District Court’s grant 
of summary judgment to Brown on appellant’s complaint arising 
from her movement to, and placement in, various facilities, and, 
by extension, the dismissal of the complaint making those 
claims against all the other defendants.  Although the NJDOC 
does have policies regarding custodial placements, these policies 
and the Due Process Clause do not give an inmate a liberty 
interest in being housed in a particular institution or at a 
particular custody level.  See, e.g., Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 
U.S. 238, 244-45, 103 S.Ct. 1741, 1745 (1983); Montanye v. 
Haymes, 427 U.S. 236, 242, 96 S.Ct. 2543, 2547 (1976).  
Furthermore, appellant did not plead facts, as distinguished from 
conclusions, explaining how her transfers among custodial 
facilities deprived her of equal protection of the law or violated 
her due process rights.  Therefore, even assuming arguendo that 
Brown participated in the decisions to transfer appellant among 
facilities and personally determined her cell assignment at the 
NJSP, appellant did not make legally justified allegations that 
could establish that Brown violated her equal protection or due 
process rights in doing so.  Of course, for the reasons we have 
set forth, appellant’s due process and equal protection claims 
fail against all the other defendants as well.   
  C.  The District Court Erred in Part in           
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                                 Analyzing Appellant’s Eighth                   
                                 Amendment Allegations. 
 Pursuant to § 1983, appellant brought Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendment claims against Brown and unnamed 
defendants predicated on their denying her potable water during 
her second and third confinements in the NJSP and clothing 
during her first and second confinements.  She also asserts that 
she was forced to appear without clothing before male prison 
personnel and inmates and was denied sanitary napkins and 
related medications for migraine headaches and menstrual 
cramps while she was menstruating.  Our first step in analyzing 
these claims is to “identify the exact contours of the underlying 
right said to have been violated” and to determine whether 
appellant has “alleged a deprivation of a constitutional right at 
all.”  Nicini, 212 F.3d at 806.  Consequently, we begin our 
discussion of this point by noting that the Constitution “does not 
mandate comfortable prisons.”  Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 
337, 349, 101 S.Ct. 2392, 2400 (1981).     
 Notwithstanding a state’s broad powers to determine 
where to place inmates, the Constitution does not permit their 
inhumane treatment because “the treatment a prisoner receives 
in prison and the conditions under which [the prisoner] is 
confined are subject to scrutiny under the Eighth Amendment.”  
Helling v. McKinney, 509 U.S. 25, 31, 113 S.Ct. 2476, 2480 
(1993).12  Thus, prison officials violate an inmate’s Eighth 
                                                 
12 The Eighth Amendment has been made applicable to the 
states through the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 400, 92 S.Ct. 
2726, 2809 (1972).  Accordingly, we only need discuss the 
alleged violations of those amendments under the Eighth 
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Amendment rights when they deprive her of “a single 
identifiable human need such as food, warmth, or exercise.”  
Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 304, 111 S.Ct. 2321, 2327 
(1991).  But an inmate’s claim that she was subjected to such a 
deprivation does not rise to the level of an Eighth Amendment 
violation unless:  (1) the prison official deprived the prisoner of 
the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities; and (2) the 
prison official acted with deliberate indifference in doing so, 
thereby exposing the inmate to a substantial risk of serious 
damage to her future health.  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 
843, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1977 (1994).   
 An inmate seeking to prove that she has been subjected to 
an Eighth Amendment violation therefore must make both an 
objective and a subjective showing to impose liability on a 
defendant.  Objectively, an inmate must show that the 
deprivation was “sufficiently serious” so that it reached the level 
of an Eighth Amendment violation.  Wilson, 501 U.S. at 297, 
111 S.Ct. at 2324.  Subjectively, an inmate must show that the 
defendant acted with “deliberate indifference” to her health or 
safety.  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 114 S.Ct. at 1977.  But to 
demonstrate a defendant’s deliberate indifference an inmate 
need not show that the defendant intentionally sought to cause 
the inmate harm or acted with knowledge that harm to the 
inmate probably would result from the defendant’s act or failure 
to act.  Id. at 835-36, 114 S.Ct. at 1978.  Though purposeful 
conduct would show at least deliberate indifference, an inmate 
satisfies her burden to make that showing if she demonstrates 
that the defendant acted or failed to act despite having 
                                                                                                             
Amendment. 
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knowledge that her actions or inaction, as the case may be, 
would subject the inmate to a substantial risk of serious harm.  
Id. at 842, 114 S.Ct. at 1981.  The proof necessary to show that 
there was a substantial risk of harm is less demanding than the 
proof needed to show that there was a probable risk of harm.   
 As we noted above, however, in our discussion of 
appellant’s complaint against Chiesa and Lanigan, she cannot 
predicate liability on her § 1983 claims on a respondeat superior 
basis.  See Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.  To set forth a claim for 
supervisory liability under § 1983, an inmate must  
(1) identify the specific supervisory practice or 
procedure that the supervisor failed to employ, 
and show that (2) the existing custom and practice 
without the identified, absent custom or procedure 
created an unreasonable risk of the ultimate 
injury, (3) the supervisor was aware that this 
unreasonable risk existed, (4) the supervisor was 
indifferent to the risk; and (5) the underling’s 
violation resulted from the supervisor’s failure to 
employ that supervisory practice or procedure.  
Brown v. Muhlenberg Twp., 269 F.3d 205, 216 (3d Cir. 2001) 
(citing Sample, 885 F.2d at 1118).   Put another way, the inmate 
must identify the supervisor’s specific acts or omissions 
demonstrating the supervisor’s deliberate indifference to the 
inmate’s risk of injury and must establish a link between the 
supervisor, the act, and the injury.  Id. 
 Appellant alleged that Brown was responsible for 
depriving her of potable water and clothing during her 
confinement in cell South-l-GG-12 at the NJSP from May 31, 
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2011, through June 2, 2011, and thereby violated her Eighth 
Amendment right against cruel and unusual punishment.  
Appellant claims that Brown ordered the removal of her clothing 
at the beginning of this three-day confinement at the NJSP and 
did not provide her with clothes or other covering until the end 
of the stay.  Appellant also claims in her brief that Brown, as a 
supervisor, knew that she was being denied potable water for the 
three-day period, and that Brown knew that correctional officers 
told her to drink from the toilet bowl when she requested 
drinking water.  Appellant’s br. at 18.  She also alleged that she 
was forced to walk to a shower unclothed in the view of male 
prison personnel and inmates and was denied sanitary napkins 
and medications for migraine headaches and menstrual cramps 
when she was menstruating.  In addition, appellant alleged that 
she was denied potable water during her third confinement at the 
NJSP from December 22, 2011, to December 23, 2011, though 
she does not charge that Brown was responsible for this second 
potable water deprivation.  
 On this appeal, we determine whether appellant 
sufficiently pleaded a cognizable Eighth Amendment 
constitutional injury so that her complaint could survive a 
motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), for, unless she did, 
the District Court did not err in granting Brown summary 
judgment.  The Court reviewed appellant’s allegations and held 
that her “Eighth Amendment claims fail to state a cognizable 
claim of a constitutional deprivation that would entitle [her] to 
relief, and the claims are dismissed with prejudice against 
Defendant Brown and all named and unidentified Defendants in 
this action.”  Chavarriaga, 2014 WL 1276345, at *10.  But when 
we accept the factual allegations in appellant’s complaint, we 
conclude that the Court partially erred in its analysis of her 
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Eighth Amendment claims. 
  1. Objective prong of Eighth Amendment    
                                  analysis  
 We assess first whether appellant’s allegations were 
sufficiently serious so that, if proven, they set forth facts 
constituting a violation of her Eighth Amendment rights.  We 
are satisfied that appellant’s allegation that she was deprived of 
potable water for three consecutive days during her second 
confinement at the NJSP did set forth such a claim because she 
alleged facts in sufficient detail that, if proven, would show that 
she was deprived of the “minimal civilized measure of life’s 
necessities.”  Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 114 S.Ct at 1977 (citation 
and internal quotation marks omitted).  We reach the same 
conclusion with respect to the denial of potable water during her 
third confinement in the NJSP even though the duration of the 
deprivation was for a shorter period than during her second 
confinement.  We also conclude that appellant’s claims that she 
was forced to walk or otherwise be naked in the presence of 
male prison personnel and inmates enroute to the shower and 
denied sanitary napkins and medications for migraine headaches 
and menstrual cramps set forth facts that, if proven, would 
constitute Eight Amendment violations.13  We are not dissuaded 
from reaching these conclusions by our recognition that, as the 
District Court observed, “[f]ederal courts have consistently held 
that isolated denials of necessities in prison for a short duration . 
. . do not rise to the level of cruel and unusual punishment in 
                                                 
13 We are combining the denial of sanitary napkins and 
mediations for migraine headaches and menstrual cramps as 
they are related, and therefore when we refer to the denial of 
sanitary napkins we are including the denial of the medications. 
  27 
violation of the Eighth Amendment.”  Chavarriaga, 2014 WL 
1276345, at *9.   
 We are of the view that appellant’s allegations that prison 
personnel intentionally denied her access to potable water for 
three days on one occasion and two days on another raised her 
allegations to a level so that rather than charging a tolerable, 
though uncomfortable, set of conditions, she had been subjected 
to a prohibited inhumane deprivation.  See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 
832, 114 S.Ct. at 1976.  A complete denial of water for three 
days other than the water in a toilet bowl lends gravity to 
appellant’s allegations because a denial of water for that length 
of time—especially when a prisoner is menstruating as appellant 
asserts that she was on one occasion—poses a clear “substantial 
risk of serious harm” to an inmate.  See id. at 833-34, 114 S.Ct. 
at 1977.  We reach the same conclusion with respect to 
appellant’s two-day NJSP confinement from December 22, 
2011, to December 23, 2011. Thus, we hold that appellant 
pleaded facts with respect to the denial of water that, if true, 
could lead to a conclusion that she was subjected to cruel and 
unusual punishment.  See id.; Young v. Quinlan, 960 F.3d 351, 
365 (3d Cir. 1992). 
 A denial of clothing in itself, however, though troubling, 
in the circumstances of this case is not a deprivation that rises to 
the level of the deprivation of water and consequently we are 
satisfied that the denial of clothing claim, except to the extent 
that it related to her being naked in the presence of male prison 
personnel and inmates, requires little discussion.  It is sufficient 
to point out that the court in Williams v. Delo found that there 
had not been an Eighth Amendment violation where the prisoner 
was placed in a strip cell without clothes but was sheltered from 
the elements.  49 F.3d 442, 443-47 (8th Cir. 1995).  
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Consequently, inasmuch as appellant did not make an objective 
showing that she suffered an Eighth Amendment violation 
merely by reason of the denial of clothing, we largely focus our 
analysis of her Eighth Amendment claim against Brown to the 
denial of potable water. 
 Our opinion, with respect to the denial of clothing, 
however, should not be overread.  In this regard we point out 
that the Supreme Court in Farmer, 511 U.S. at 832, 114 S.Ct. at 
1976, indicated that prison officials “must ensure that inmates 
receive adequate food, clothing, shelter, and medical care . . . .”  
Thus, we are limiting our holding with respect to the denial of 
clothing to the facts of this case.  Moreover, we exclude from 
our holding appellant’s claim that she was forced to walk down 
a staircase and a hallway naked in plain view of male prison 
personnel and inmates to reach a shower or otherwise was 
exposed while naked to male prison personnel and inmates.  In 
our view this allegation asserts an Eighth Amendment claim 
because forcing her to be naked in these circumstances would be 
a malicious act intended to humiliate her for no legitimate 
penological reason.  See King v. McCary 781 F.3d 889, 896, 
898 (7th Cir. 2015); Lee v. Down, 641 F.2d 1117, 1119 (4th Cir. 
1981). 
 We also hold that appellant alleged facts that constituted 
a cause of action when she claimed that officers denied her 
sanitary napkins and medications while she was menstruating.  
Clearly, that was an allegation sufficient to constitute an Eighth 
Amendment violation.  See Adkins v. Cnty. of Orange, 372 F. 
Supp. 2d 377, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2005). 
  2. Subjective prong of Eighth Amendment  
                                 analysis 
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 When we address the subjective prong of appellant’s 
Eighth Amendment claim we are concerned with Brown as a 
named and participating defendant and we consider first whether 
the deprivation of water can be tied to what appellant contends 
was Brown’s intentional act or deliberate indifference to her 
health or safety during her May 31, 2011, to June 2, 2011 
confinement at the NJSP.  See Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834, 114 
S.Ct. at 1977; Labatad v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 714 F.3d 1155, 
1160 (9th Cir. 2013).  “A prison official must ‘be aware of facts 
from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk 
of serious harm exists, and . . . must also draw the inference.’”  
Id. (quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 837, 114 S.Ct. at 1977).  
“Liability may follow only if a prison official ‘knows that 
inmates face a substantial risk of serious harm and disregards 
that risk by failing to take reasonable measures to abate it.’” Id. 
(quoting Farmer, 511 U.S. at 847, 114 S.Ct. at 1984). 
 We are satisfied that appellant’s allegations that Brown 
intentionally denied her potable water for three days or was 
deliberately indifferent to the denial were insufficient to impose 
liability on Brown because appellant did not adequately allege 
facts attributing the denial to Brown.  Although the complaint 
pleaded that Brown was one of an unspecified number of 
supervisors of the correctional officers who interacted with 
appellant, appellant did not make specific allegations concerning 
Brown’s duties as a supervisor, or her interactions or 
communications with correctional officers in general, let alone 
with the officers directly involved with appellant’s custody.  The 
complaint did allege that Brown forced appellant to drink water 
“from a dirty toilet bowl,” but this allegation was conclusory 
because appellant did not plead that Brown gave a direction for 
appellant to drink in this way.    
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 It is clear that appellant based her complaint against 
Brown for the denial of water on the actions of subordinate 
personnel, and thus appellant was seeking to place liability on 
Brown on a respondeat superior theory or was alleging that 
Brown was liable on some other theory merely because of her 
position as a supervisor.  But Brown’s position as a supervisor 
without more did not make her responsible for her subordinates’ 
conduct.  Accordingly, we cannot infer from the factual 
allegations in the complaint that Brown should have been alerted 
to a history of mistreatment of inmates in general or of appellant 
in particular.  And, although appellant alleged in her complaint 
that she was placed in a known “condemned” cell that frequently 
was without water, that allegation does not support a claim that 
Brown knew or should have known that appellant was deprived 
of water, subjecting her to a substantial risk of harm during her 
three-day confinement at the NJSP from May 31, 2011, until 
June 2, 2011.  See Wood v. Beauclair, 692 F.3d 1041, 1051 (9th 
Cir. 2012) (prison supervisors lacked knowledge of risk to 
inmate when supervisor had no reason to suspect mistreatment 
and inmate did not complain of actions to prison officials until 
long after the incidents occurred).   
 We also are satisfied that appellant did not adequately 
plead that Brown was instrumental in requiring her to go to the 
shower or otherwise be naked while in the presence of male 
prison personnel and inmates and in not supplying her with 
sanitary napkins and medications.  Rather, though she did plead 
that Brown directed that her clothing be taken from her, her 
allegations with respect to the walk to the shower or otherwise 
be naked in the presence of male prison personnel and inmates 
and the denial of sanitary napkins and medications are 
generalized with respect to the individuals responsible for these 
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actions.    
 Although appellant did not adequately plead that Brown 
should have known that she was deprived of water for three 
days, we reiterate our rejection of the District Court’s 
conclusion that the deprivations of potable water in this case 
could not be cruel and unusual punishment under the Eighth 
Amendment.  See Chavarriaga, 2014 WL 1276345, at *9.  Thus, 
while we uphold the grant of summary judgment on the denial 
of potable water as well as on the naked shower walk and other 
naked exposures and the denial of sanitary napkin and 
medications claims in Brown’s favor, we will reverse the 
District Court’s dismissal of the Eighth Amendment claims 
against the unknown defendants that appellant alleged were 
responsible for these deprivations and will remand the case for 
further proceedings on these claims.   
  D. The District Court Partly Erred In            
                                 Analyzing Appellant’s Eighth   
             Amendment Allegations and Related       
                                 State-Law Claims Relating to her Body   
                                 Cavity Search. 
 Appellant’s next claim of unconstitutional punishment 
challenges the legality of a cavity search in which a prison guard 
inserted her fingers into appellant’s vagina and rectum.  In 
advancing this claim, appellant did not assert that she was 
deprived of any of life’s necessities but rather that she was 
subjected to a painful and unwarranted use of force.  “In the 
excessive force context, society’s expectations are different[]” 
than in the context of prison conditions, and accordingly the test 
for an Eighth Amendment violation is different as well.  Hudson 
v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9, 112 S.Ct. 995, 1000 (1992).  
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“When prison officials maliciously and sadistically use force to 
cause harm, contemporary standards of decency always are 
violated.  This is true whether or not significant injury is 
evident.”  Id. (citation omitted). 
        The District Court held that the cavity search was 
justifiable as a “routine security measure,” noting that the 
Supreme Court has “held that it is constitutional to conduct a 
full strip search of an individual detained in the general 
population of a jail.” Chavarriaga, 2014 WL 127634, at *12-13. 
 But in that Supreme Court case, Florence v. Board of Chosen 
Freeholders, the Court was concerned with whether a uniform 
policy of “strip searching” detainees held in a general jail 
population violated the detainees’ rights under the Fourth 
Amendment—not the Eighth Amendment on which appellant 
relies.14  132 S.Ct. 1510, 1515-16 (2012).  More importantly, the 
strip searches in Florence involved only the visual inspection of 
detainees’ body cavities, and there “[we]re no allegations that 
the detainees . . . were touched in any way as part of the 
searches.”  Id. at 1515.  Indeed, in response to an amici’s 
“concerns about instances of officers engaging in intentional 
                                                 
14 The District Court treated the body cavity search claim under 
the Fourth Amendment as it held that appellant “does not allege 
any facts to show that the strip search was so outside the scope 
of a reasonable search policy that it would rise to the level of a 
Fourth Amendment violation.”  Chavarriaga, 2014 WL 127634, 
at *13 (internal quotation marks omitted).  But our result on the 
body cavity search issue would not be different even if we 
considered that appellant made the claim under the Fourth 
Amendment.  In any event, appellant pled the claim under the 
Eighth Amendment.  (J.A. 92.)  
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humiliation and other abusive practices,” the Court recognized 
that there may “be legitimate concerns about the invasiveness of 
searches that involve the touching of detainees.”  Id. at 1523.  
Thus, Florence does not govern here.   
 Florence does stand for the proposition that “a regulation 
impinging on an inmate’s constitutional rights must be upheld 
‘if it is reasonably related to legitimate penological interests.’”  
132 S.Ct. at 1515 (quoting Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 89, 
107 S.Ct. 2254, 2261 (1987)).15  But appellant does not 
challenge a prison regulation—in fact, she alleged that Jane Doe 
searched her body cavities in violation of the applicable 
regulations.  The factors our Court considers in applying the 
“legitimate penological interest” test further demonstrate that the 
test is ill-suited for assessing unauthorized and malicious 
conduct on the part of prison guards.  See Sharp v. Johnson, 669 
F.3d 144, 156 (3d Cir. 2012). 
        The District Court also determined that it should defer to 
the judgment of corrections officials on the question of whether 
                                                 
15 In J.B. v. Fassnacht,  801 F.3d 336 (3d Cir. 2015), we held, 
contrary to the district court in that case, that the holding in 
Florence applies to juvenile offenders admitted to the general 
population of a juvenile detention center.  Consequently, we 
reversed an order denying summary judgment to police and 
public official defendants in an action brought against them by a 
juvenile subjected to a strip search upon his detention in a 
juvenile facility.  The significance of the case here is its focus 
on the importance of security in custodial facilities.  However, 
the search in Fassnacht was not nearly as intrusive as appellant’s 
body cavity search and thus the case adds little support to Jane 
Doe’s position on this appeal. 
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the cavity search was permissible, and it concluded that the 
search was permissible as “a routine security measure.”  
Chavarriaga, 2014 WL 127634, at *13.  Appellant plainly 
alleged facts that demonstrate that the cavity search was not 
routine for, as we already have explained, she asserted that the 
prison personnel made such a search on only one of the three 
occasions she was held at the NJSP.  In addition, she alleged 
that the search was conducted in a manner that violated 
applicable New Jersey regulations.  In this regard, the 
regulations provide that before such a search is made, a 
supervisor must have reasonable suspicion to believe that 
contraband will be found in the inmate’s body cavity.  Then, if 
there is to be a search, the prison personnel must take the inmate 
to the infirmary and offer the inmate the assistance of a medical 
provider in removing the contraband.  The regulations further 
provide that prison personnel cannot remove contraband 
involuntarily unless they follow a detailed set of procedures and 
that the supervisor authorizing the search must prepare a written 
report of the basis for, conduct of, and results of the search.  See 
N.J. Admin. Code § 10A:3-5.8.  According to the complaint the 
prison personnel disregarded these procedures in their entirety. 
        But the constitutional question that we face is not whether 
New Jersey’s policies on cavity searches are reasonable or even 
whether the prison personnel followed them.  Rather, the 
constitutional question is whether appellant plausibly has 
alleged that Jane Doe maliciously searched her body cavities.  
See Hudson, 503 U.S. at 9, 112 S.Ct. at 1000.  To that end, the 
allegation that the prison personnel did not follow the 
regulations gives some support to an inference that the search 
was malicious.  We find additional support for drawing that 
inference because appellant alleged that the cavity search was so 
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painful that during the search she cracked a molar in two while 
clenching her teeth. (J.A. 80.)  Nevertheless, neither the District 
Court nor the participating defendants have addressed the 
question of whether the cavity search violated the Eighth 
Amendment.  After our consideration of the body cavity search 
issue, we will reverse the District Court’s order dismissing 
appellant’s Eighth Amendment claims against Jane Doe and will 
remand the case for further proceedings on these claims.    
 Notwithstanding our foregoing discussion, we hold that 
the District Court correctly granted Brown summary judgment 
on appellant’s Eighth Amendment body cavity search claim.  In 
her brief, appellant attempts to implicate Brown in her manual 
body cavity search by claiming that “Jane Doe’s simultaneous 
digital penetration of plaintiff’s vagina and rectum was 
committed in the presence of her direct supervisor, Sgt. Brown.” 
 Appellant’s br. at 31.  Yet this statement, though quite specific, 
was in appellant’s brief and not her complaint, and is of 
questionable significance as she goes on in her brief to indicate 
that Brown “evidently authorized and supervised” the search, a 
comment that suggests that she only is surmising that Brown 
was involved in the search.  Id. at 33 (emphasis added).  In any 
event, appellant by making these allegations in her brief cannot 
overcome the lack of an adequate pleading in her complaint 
alleging with specificity that Brown was involved in the search. 
 In fact, although appellant did allege in her complaint that 
Brown “supervised various DOC personnel,” she did not allege 
that Brown supervised Jane Doe.  (J.A. 72.)  Although a court 
on a motion to dismiss ordinarily “must accept the allegations in 
the complaint as true,” it is not compelled to accept assertions in 
a brief without support in the pleadings.  Morrow, 719 F.3d at 
165.  After all, a brief is not a pleading.  We therefore will 
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affirm the District Court’s grant of summary judgment on the 
body cavity claim in favor of Brown.  
 E. Equal Protection Claims with Respect to Denial 
                      of Potable Water, the Body Cavity Search, and   
                      Contentions of Other Constitutional Violations. 
 Appellant asserts that she was denied potable water, 
subjected to the body cavity search, and forced to endure the 
other violations to which we have referred for discriminatory 
reasons that violated the Equal Protection Clause of the 
Fourteenth Amendment.  But she does not assert that defendants 
discriminated against her because of her race or any other 
protected classification; rather, she claims that defendants 
treated her inhumanely because they were retaliating against her 
because of the lawsuit she filed against Somerset County 
detectives who she claims used excessive force in arresting her. 
          Appellant’s assertions are most easily understood as being 
a First Amendment retaliation claim.  “Retaliating against a 
prisoner for the exercise of [her] constitutional rights is 
unconstitutional.”  Bistrian v. Levi, 696 F.3d 352, 376 (3d Cir. 
2012).  If defendants punished appellant for exercising her right 
to petition the courts, they are liable for violating the First 
Amendment.  See id.  But even though appellant raised the First 
Amendment in her brief, she did not plead a First Amendment 
claim in her complaint.  Therefore, there is not a First 
Amendment claim properly before us.  See McClintock v. 
Eichelberger, 169 F.3d 812, 817 (3d Cir. 1999); Krouse v. Am. 
Sterilizer Co., 126 F.3d 494, 499 (3d Cir. 1997). 
        Instead of pleading her claim under the First Amendment, 
as we have indicated appellant asserted in her complaint that 
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defendants’ acts of retaliation violated the Equal Protection 
Clause.  But inasmuch as appellant did not allege that her 
membership in a protected group was the motivation for 
unfavorable treatment, the only claim available to her is that she 
was arbitrarily singled out for this treatment as a “class of one.”  
In order “to state a claim for [a] ‘class of one’ [denial of] equal 
protection, a plaintiff must at a minimum allege that [s]he was 
intentionally treated differently from others similarly situated by 
the defendant and that there was no rational basis for such 
treatment.”  Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 243 
(3d Cir. 2008); see also Renchenski v. Williams, 622 F.3d 315, 
337-38 (3d Cir. 2010) (analyzing such a claim in the prison 
context). 
        The District Court dismissed appellant’s equal protection 
claim solely on the ground that her disciplinary infractions 
prompted her transfers to the NJSP and therefore there was a 
rational basis for the transfers.  (J.A. 24.)  Appellant disputes 
this conclusion, noting that the second transfer was not 
authorized and the prison has admitted that it was made in error. 
 Moreover, appellant claims that a false accusation engineered 
by corrections personnel led to the third transfer. 
        We are satisfied that the District Court mischaracterized 
appellant’s equal protection claim.  Though, as we held above, 
appellant’s transfers did not violate the equal protection clause, 
and even if there was a rational basis for transferring appellant 
to the NJSP, she contends there was no rational basis for her 
treatment once she arrived there.  Indeed, appellant hit the 
“perverse jackpot” of being assigned to the same cell without 
potable water on all three occasions that she was confined in the 
NJSP.  Appellant alleges that the adverse treatment to which she 
was subjected did not comply with official prison policies, 
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including those relating to body cavity searches, and she 
contends that they rose to the level of a constitutional violation.  
We find support for this allegation for, as noted above, the 
cavity search was plainly not a routine security measure because 
the prison personnel made such a search only during appellant’s 
second confinement in the NJSP and, so far as we are aware, not 
because appellant committed a disciplinary infraction or in some 
way led the prison personnel to believe that she was concealing 
contraband in her body.  When considered in light of the fact 
that appellant had filed the suit against the detectives that we 
described above, her treatment may support a retaliation claim 
and, if so, the search was not made for a legitimate penological 
reason.  Accordingly, we believe that it reasonably could be 
inferred that prison personnel targeted her intentionally without 
a legitimate penological basis.16  The District Court erred in 
concluding otherwise and thus, on remand, appellant should be 
able to proceed on her body cavity search, denial of potable 
water, being forced to walk to the shower or otherwise exposed 
while naked in the presence of male prison personnel and 
inmates, and denial of sanitary napkins and medications claims 
on an equal protection as well as an Eighth Amendment basis.   
  F. Appellant’s State-Law Claims 
 As described above, appellant asserts in her brief, though 
not in her complaint, that her body cavity search violated the 
criteria in N.J. Admin. Code § 10A:3-5.8, a regulation 
governing inmates’ body cavity searches and requiring that 
correctional personnel conduct body cavity searches at a 
                                                 
16 A jury might decline to draw that inference if it believed that 
the prison personnel would not have been concerned with 
appellant’s suit against other individuals. 
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facility’s infirmary.  But in her complaint appellant made this 
allegation without citation to the specific regulation that she 
claims was violated.  We nevertheless conclude that the 
pleading is adequate to survive a motion to dismiss, and 
therefore we will reverse the District Court’s Rule 12(b)(6) 
dismissal of this state-law claim as to Jane Doe.  We, however, 
will not preclude a defendant substituted for Jane Doe from 
arguing that a violation of N.J. Admin. Code § 10A:3-5.8(b) 
cannot give rise to civil liability as a definitive resolution on this 
issue should not be made in the absence of the actual defendant 
charged with the violation. 
 We have not overlooked appellant’s attempt in her brief 
to implicate Brown in a N.J. Admin. Code § 10A:3-5.8 violation 
on the basis of a different provision than subsection 5.8(b).  On 
appeal, appellant asserts in her brief that Brown, as a supervisor, 
violated N.J. Admin. Code § 10A:3-5.8(g), which provides:   
[T]he custody staff member in charge shall 
prepare a written report of the results of a body 
cavity search that shall be made part of the 
inmate’s record and shall include, but is not 
limited to, the following information:  1. A 
statement of facts indicating reasonable suspicion 
for the search;  2. The name of the custody staff 
member in charge who authorized the search. 
But the complaint did not make an adequate allegation against 
Brown under N.J. Admin. Code § 10A:3-5.8(g) even if a 
violation of that provision could be actionable, as it did not 
allege that Brown was Jane Doe’s supervisor or provide any 
other allegations sufficient to link Brown to appellant’s manual 
body cavity search.  After all, even if at some times Brown 
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supervised Jane Doe, Brown surely was not on duty around the 
clock, so we cannot draw an inference from the complaint that 
Brown gave an instruction to Jane Doe to make the search.  
Thus, the complaint did not adequately plead that Brown was 
the individual who should have made a timely record of the 
grounds for reasonable suspicion that the search would lead to 
the discovery of contraband.   
 Considering all the circumstances of the case, we are 
satisfied that there is no basis to hold Brown liable for any 
violation of state-law regulations governing searches.  Appellant 
did not make sufficient allegations in her complaint that Brown 
was or should have been involved in the oversight of her search, 
or, in fact, was involved in the search.  Though we accept the 
allegation that appellant was subject to a manual body cavity 
search in a cell contrary to a regulation requiring that all body 
cavity searches of inmates be conducted in an institution’s 
infirmary on the basis of a supervisor’s finding of reasonable 
suspicion, appellant has not tied Brown to any violation of this 
regulation.  We accordingly will affirm the grant of summary 
judgment on appellant’s state-law body cavity search claim in 
favor of Brown.17  
                                                 
17 Appellant filed a cross-motion for summary judgment against 
Lanigan, Brown, and the NJDOC and she appeals the District 
Court’s denial of that motion.  “Although an order denying [a] 
motion for summary judgment is not ordinarily final and 
appealable, it becomes appealable when accompanied by an 
order granting a cross-motion for summary judgment.”  Gardner 
v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 544 F.3d 553, 557 n.1 (3d Cir. 
2008) (citing Nazay v. Miller, 949 F.2d 1323, 1328 (3d Cir. 
1991)).  That scenario is the procedural posture here because 
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 G. Putative Class Claims 
 Inasmuch as the District Court dismissed all of 
appellant’s claims under Rule 12(b)(6), except to the extent that 
it granted the participating defendants summary judgment which 
had the same consequence as a Rule 12(b)(6) dismissal, the 
Court understandably denied as moot her motion for class action 
certification.  But to the extent that our disposition of this appeal 
includes a remand of this case to the District Court for further 
proceedings on certain of appellant’s claims, we cannot say that 
a motion for class action certification will continue to be moot.  
In the circumstances, we will affirm the order denying 
appellant’s motion for class action certification but do so 
without prejudice to appellant seeking class action certification 
on the remand.   
 
VI.  CONCLUSION 
 We will affirm the District Court’s order for summary 
judgment in favor of Chiesa, Lanigan, and Brown.  We will 
reverse the Court’s order of dismissal of appellant’s cruel and 
unusual punishment Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth 
Amendment and parallel state-law claims against the unnamed 
defendants with respect to the alleged denial of potable water 
                                                                                                             
Lanigan and Brown obtained summary judgment and the Court 
granted equivalent relief to the NJDOC.  In view of those 
dispositions, we have jurisdiction over appellant’s appeal from 
the denial of her motion for summary judgment.  It is clear that 
in light of our other holdings, the Court correctly denied that 
motion. 
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and sanitary napkins and related medications to appellant and 
with respect to appellant being required to go to the shower or 
otherwise be exposed while naked in the presence of male 
prison personnel and inmates.  We will reverse the order of 
dismissal of appellant’s cruel and unusual punishment body 
cavity search claims under the Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments and parallel state-law constitutional claims as to 
Jane Doe.  We will reverse the order of dismissal of appellant’s 
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection claims and parallel 
state-law denial of potable water and sanitary napkins and 
medications and being forced to walk or otherwise be exposed 
while naked in the presence of male prison personnel and 
inmates and body cavity search claims.  We will reverse the 
dismissal of the body cavity search claim in violation of New 
Jersey regulations against unknown defendants.  We will affirm 
the order denying appellant’s motion for class action 
certification without prejudice to its renewal on remand.  We 
will affirm the order denying appellant’s cross-motions for 
partial summary judgment against Lanigan, Brown, and the 
DOC and for sanctions against participating defendants’ 
counsel.  We will remand the case to the District Court for 
further proceedings on the claims the dismissal of which we are 
reversing and, if presented, for further proceedings on a renewed 
motion for class action certification.  We emphasize that the 
only substantive claims that may go forward on the remand are 
those related to the denial of water, the body cavity search, the 
denial of sanitary napkins and related medications, and the 
forcing of appellant to appear naked in the presence of male 
prison personnel and inmates.18   
                                                 
18 We have not determined whether, if appellant attempts to 
proceed in this action on remand, she should be permitted to 
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 We express no opinion on the conclusiveness of our 
findings on any newly added defendants on the remand as that 
matter will be for the District Court to decide.  We note that 
there are two named defendants, Sheppard and Wair, other than 
the participating defendants who already are in the case, but we 
will not allow appellant on the remand to proceed against them 
at this late date, as they have been parties since the filing of the 
final amended complaint in this case and appellant has not been 
prosecuting the case against them.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c).  In 
the circumstances, we regard the case against them as 
abandoned.  The parties will bear their own costs on this appeal.  
 
                                                                                                             
amend her complaint to name actual defendants because the 
parties have not briefed the point.  Therefore, the right to 
challenge such potential amendments is preserved. 
